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Transparent Review of Agency Immigration Decisions 
 
The administrative state has played an increasingly dominant role 
in implementing immigration law in the United States. While Congress 
and the President have historically been granted plenary power that 
limits constitutional judicial review, those same limitations have been 
applied haphazardly to grant plenary power to administrative agencies 
as well. Extensive scholarship discusses the role of plenary power in judicial 
review of the political branches, but there is a dearth of literature 
evaluating its role in administrative law. Yet the events of the past two 
decades, including President Barack Obama’s executive mandate on 
November 20, 2014, have revealed that the extension of plenary power to 
administrative agencies subordinates constitutional principles to 
statutory prescriptions or even administrative practice. As a result, 
constitutional analysis of immigration decisions is prevented while 
statutory review is allowed on the theory that courts must uphold plenary 
power for the legislative branch by enforcing its statutes. Thus, courts 
review immigration decisions primarily by enforcing statutes like the 
1942 Administrative Procedures Act (APA), the 1952 Immigration 
and Naturalization Act (INA), and the 1996 Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Together, these 
enactments provide oversight and accountability to those charged with 
administering immigration law in order to promote efficiency while 
protecting individual rights and preserving constitutional separation of 
powers. However, even those clearly constitutional objectives are often 
accomplished under the guise of statutory interpretation in order to avoid 
violating the plenary power doctrine. In a recent example, the 2014 
executive mandate and subsequent memoranda of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) have been challenged as substantive 
legislative rules under the APA that require notice-and-comment 
procedures. Statutory review grounded in these enactments, but actually 
based on constitutional principles, can only go so far in preserving 
constitutional rights and preventing expansion of executive power. 
Instead, plenary power should be disentangled from constitutional 
judicial review of the political branches, and eliminated altogether in the 
administrative state. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Pedro was stranded at the gas station where his truck’s battery 
died. He knew that he had to figure something out soon, because 
when he left home just a few minutes before, his wife and children 
were excited at the prospect of a full day’s labor. A full day of work 
meant a stress-free weekend that Pedro could enjoy with his family—
a rarity for Pedro, who usually spent weekends on the street corner 
waiting for contractors who needed his services. But today was 
different. Today, his friend had told him about an opportunity to work 
in the oil fields only two hours away from Pedro’s home. And now, 
today, Pedro was stranded at the gas station. 
Pedro was a good man who cared for his family and did his best 
to obey the law. As an undocumented worker in the United States, he 
believed that he had been blessed to make it safely across the border 
and cautiously avoided anything that would cause him to throw that 
blessing away. As Pedro asked others at the gas station for help, he 
struck up a conversation with other Mexican immigrants who 
understood his plight. Pedro did not really understand recent changes 
in immigration law, and the terms “DACA” and “DAPA” were foreign 
to him. But Pedro knew one thing: he needed that piece of paper 
authorizing him to work. For Pedro, that was salvation. Sure, a few of 
his friends who had obtained work authorization still spent each day 
scraping out a living, uncertain about the source of their next job, 
paycheck, and meal. But he knew that he could not even hope for a 
stable future without clearing that first hurdle. Pedro would do 
anything to be authorized to work.1 
On the other hand, Arnulfo had a relatively sordid past. He had 
turned his life around and was working hard to provide for his wife 
and five-year-old son—both of whom are citizens—but his two DUI 
convictions made it extremely difficult for him to ever obtain legal 
permanent residency. He had been able to renew his Employment 
Authorization Document each year and continue his job in 
construction. That is, until March 2015, when his application for 
renewal was denied due to his criminal record. Now Arnulfo had just 
four weeks to either leave the country or officially enter the ranks of 
 
 1. Interview with immigrant, name changed for anonymity, in Provo, Utah (Dec. 
19, 2014). 
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the undocumented. He hoped that his boss, who had become his 
friend, would never realize that the copy of Arnulfo’s work 
authorization on file was about to expire.2 
It is difficult to imagine many stories where deportation becomes 
an option that will not present heart-breaking humanitarian 
difficulties. However, when the judiciary abdicates its role in reviewing 
immigration decisions for constitutionality, policies and procedures 
continue unchecked in such a way that aliens in the United States are 
kept in permanent limbo,3 wondering whether their case will be the 
next case that is chosen for deportation based upon some immigration 
official’s discretion. 
The challenges are particularly difficult given the nature of the 
laws that must be administered, now by the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). Those laws are politically charged and substantially 
impact the lives of individuals whose hardships in the face of 
enforcement are often palpable. Families can be divided, homes left 
empty, children abandoned, opportunities foreclosed, and liberty 
rescinded. While these are all outcomes that are common in criminal 
law enforcement, the DHS is faced with violations of the law that do 
not seem as morally reprehensible as crimes like theft, robbery, or even 
vandalism.4 While deportation is perhaps not as liberty-restricting as 
imprisonment, it often serves as a form of banishment and exile that 
results in additional barriers to entry, making it even less likely for a 
noncitizen to enter the United States legally after being removed.5 
There is a great deal of scholarship discussing plenary power and 
prosecutorial discretion in immigration law.6 However, there has never 
been a thorough analysis of how the plenary power doctrine interacts 
 
 2. Interview with immigrant, name changed for anonymity, in Provo, Utah (Mar. 
8, 2015). 
 3. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 298 (2010). 
 4. Improper entry is only a misdemeanor for first-time offenders, and unlawful presence 
is not even a crime. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012). 
 5. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012); Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Illegal Reentry Under § 276 
of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1326) of Alien Who Has Been Denied 
Admission, Excluded, Deported, or Removed or Has Departed United States While Order of 
Exclusion, Deportation, or Removal Is Outstanding, 177 A.L.R. FED. 459 (2002). 
 6. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, 
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. 
L. REV. 1, 81–87 (2002); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary 
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990); 
Wadhia, supra note 3. 
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with the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). More specifically, 
given the subtly diminishing role of plenary power in immigration 
cases and the not-so-subtle expansion of the administrative state, no 
one has considered how APA review of immigration decisions is 
appropriate even when constitutional review is prevented by 
plenary power. 
This Comment attempts to begin a conversation about questions 
that are certain to take center stage in defining immigration law in the 
years to come. It argues that immigration law, despite its tradition of 
plenary power, cannot create a system that protects individual rights 
while promoting administrative efficiency simply by reviewing 
immigration decisions on statutory technicalities. Therefore, courts 
should only continue to grant plenary power if they also provide 
transparent constitutional review of immigration decisions, and that 
plenary power should not be granted to administrative agencies. Part 
I of this Comment reviews the history and evolution of immigration 
law and judicial review. Part II outlines the history and structure of 
the APA, and discusses the increase in executive mandates guiding 
administrative action. Part III discusses the application of the APA to 
executive action, analyzes its relationship to plenary power, and 
evaluates related legal issues surrounding President Obama’s recent 
executive mandate. Part IV makes a recommendation for redefining 
the way that courts provide judicial review of immigration decisions. 
I. HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION LAW AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Courts have used a number of different justifications for reviewing 
exclusion orders, deportation proceedings, citizenship and 
naturalization hearings, and numerous other actions that constitute 
the field of immigration law.7 The changing justifications for review 
follow a pattern of deference to immigration officials tempered by 
recognition of the basic rights of non-citizens within the United 
States.8 The plenary power doctrine significantly impacts every 
instance of judicial review of an immigration decision. Thus, this Part 
 
 7. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN & HIROSHI MOTOMURA, 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 260 (5th ed. 2003). 
 8. Cf. Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 1 (1984) (“Probably no other area of American law has been so radically insulated and 
divergent from those fundamental norms of constitutional right, administrative procedure, and 
judicial role that animate the rest of our legal system.”). 
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first briefly describes the history and application of the plenary power 
doctrine. Second, it discusses congressional enactments that have 
formed the basis for judicial review of immigration law. Third, it 
describes the waning influence of the plenary power doctrine and the 
increasing use of prosecutorial discretion to make immigration 
decisions. Finally, it reviews Congress’s 1996 immigration statute. 
A. Plenary Power 
Immigration law has traditionally enjoyed special treatment at a 
constitutional level as a result of the plenary power doctrine.9 The 
doctrine took its most definite form in the 1889 Chinese Exclusion 
Case, where the Court’s holding made it clear that the federal 
government could regulate immigration virtually without the threat 
of judicial review.10 In that case, a Chinese immigrant, Chae Chan 
Ping, had come to the United States under a treaty that provided for 
unrestricted immigration from China.11 Shortly thereafter, a new 
treaty permitted limitations by the United States government on 
Chinese immigration. Pursuant to that treaty, Congress banned 
Chinese immigration for ten years in 1882 with a provision that 
immigrants wishing to leave could obtain certificates for reentry.12 
However, a year after Chae Chan Ping obtained a certificate and 
returned to China, Congress excluded even those that had certificates 
of reentry in 1887.13 The Court emphasized the federal government’s 
power in immigration matters under the Constitution, and declined 
to consider alien rights as limits on government action. In doing so, it 
held that the federal government had the power “to exclude foreigners 
from the country whenever, in its judgment, the public interests 
require such exclusion.”14 
 
 9. Motomura, supra note 6, at 547. 
 10. Id. at 551. 
 11. Id. at 550–51. 
 12. Id. at 551. 
 13. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 599–600 (1889); Motomura, supra 
note 6, at 551. 
 14. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 604–07 (1889) (“While under our Constitution and 
form of government the great mass of local matters is controlled by local authorities, the United 
States, in their relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens are one nation, invested 
with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the 
maintenance of its absolute independence and security throughout its entire territory.”); see also 
Motomura, supra note 6, at 551–52. 
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Since that case, courts have been hesitant to entertain 
constitutional challenges about which aliens should be admitted or 
expelled because the plenary power doctrine declares that Congress 
and the executive branch have nearly exclusive and certainly very 
broad authority over immigration matters.15 Thus, “classical 
immigration law,” as it has been termed, has resulted in a permissive 
judicial approach to “restrictive nationalism,” even though it sharply 
diverges from the liberal human rights philosophy that has dominated 
other areas of the law.16 The decision in the Chinese Exclusion Case was 
based on a judicial preference for preserving the nation’s sovereignty.17 
Because of this preference, the persistent, gradual changes of the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries that led to a complete overhaul of 
the administrative state did not fully impact judicial review of 
immigration law.18 
Despite courts’ commitment to the plenary power doctrine, 
judicial review has been permitted by application of the “Great Writ” 
of habeas corpus in cases where the noncitizen seeking review is in 
physical custody.19 Enshrined in the Suspension Clause in Article I, 
Section 9, Clause 2, the Constitution states: “The privilege of the Writ 
of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”20 Nevertheless, 
even though aliens have not been left completely without remedy in 
immigration cases, the balance has traditionally tilted decidedly in 
favor of the political branches and their plenary power to make 
immigration decisions even when they negatively impact the rights 
of noncitizens. 
B. Congressional Oversight of Immigration Administration 
Interestingly, while the Chinese Exclusion Cases and subsequent 
case law reserved plenary power for the executive and legislative 
branches, they did not provide extremely clear guidance for how that 
 
 15. Motomura, supra note 6, at 547. 
 16. Schuck, supra note 8, at 3. 
 17. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 600–09 (1889). 
 18. Schuck, supra note 8, at 3. 
 19. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 7, at 259–60. 
 20. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
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power should be allocated or implemented.21 Thus, the nineteenth 
century saw a proliferation of congressional enactments seeking to 
define and regulate the roles of those involved in implementing the 
law. In relatively quick succession, Congress enacted two extensive 
regulatory regimes, the APA in 194622 and the INA in 1952,23 which 
dramatically changed the way the courts approached immigration 
law.24 Specifically, the INA provided for judicial review using the 
procedures outlined in the APA for all cases arising under the INA.25 
In fact, some in Congress sought to exempt immigration decisions 
from review under the APA entirely,26 arguing that judicial oversight 
would create a costly and cumbersome bureaucracy that was 
inappropriate for the political and foreign affairs functions of 
immigration law.27 While no such exemption was codified, the 
exemption exists for all practical purposes. In practice, the new 
statutory regime under the INA required courts to balance a deeply 
ingrained tradition of respecting the government’s plenary power with 
a statutory command to review immigration decisions under the APA 
and INA. The INA did not result in universal application of APA 
review in the courts, which this comment argues is largely due to a 
continued commitment to plenary power. However, immigration 
cases increased as a percentage of the overall administrative caseload 
 
 21. Motomura, supra note 6, at 551. 
 22. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in 
5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06 and scattered sections of Title 5). 
 23. Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 
(codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537). 
 24. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 
YALE L.J. 458, 515–16 (2009). 
 25. Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 1963, 1968 (2000); see Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955) 
(clarifying that the INA’s provision that deportation orders of the Attorney General should be 
“final” only meant final for the administrative procedure); see also Immigration Act of 1917, 
Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39 Stat. 874, 890 (stating that the “[deportation] decision of the Secretary 
of Labor shall be final”); Reorganization Plan of April 3, 1939, Reorganization Plan No. 76-5, 
54 Stat. 1238 (transferring the Immigration and Naturalization Service from the Department of 
Labor to the Department of Justice). 
 26. See H.R. 6652, 80th Cong. (1948) (as referred to H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary on 
May 24, 1948) (exempting immigration decisions from the APA); 94 CONG. REC. 5655, 6374 
(1948) (exempting immigration decisions from the APA was sent to the house judiciary 
committee where it was reviewed but no further action was taken). 
 27. Schuck, supra note 8, at 32. 
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by eight percent.28 That growth has only heightened the challenges 
that have always existed for those charged with implementing 
immigration law under complex statutory regimes, now with the 
added procedural requirements of the APA. 
C. Prosecutorial Discretion and Plenary Power After the INA 
In the decades since the APA and INA became law, the same 
outcomes produced under the plenary power doctrine have been 
achieved using prosecutorial discretion. While the term “prosecutorial 
discretion” generally refers to executive decisions to allocate 
enforcement resources and to elect not to prosecute certain categories 
of offenses or individuals, the end result is similar to that of the plenary 
power doctrine—namely, that courts are substantially limited in 
reviewing the enforcement decisions of immigration officials.29 The 
INS, along with every other administrative agency, has always used 
prosecutorial discretion in one form or another. However, there is no 
record of when the INS began implementing a systematic internal 
policy of prosecutorial discretion.30 
The practice came to light in 1974 in a lawsuit regarding the 
deportation of British songwriter John Lennon.31 In seeking to obtain 
permanent residency in the United States, Lennon’s attorney used the 
Freedom of Information Act to obtain the “blue sheets”—documents 
used privately by administrators in the INS—that had previously been 
unavailable to the public.32 Those documents revealed a deferred 
action policy by which the INS categorized individuals as “non-
priority” for removal where removal would be unconscionable.33 That 
 
 28. Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of 
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1015–16 (1990) (“[I]mmigration cases, 
which comprised only 5.4% of the caseload in 1965, now account for 13.7% and comprise the 
third largest group of cases (after the NLRB and MSPB cases).”). 
 29. See, e.g., Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 354 (1956) (explaining that the agency decision 
to suspend deportation is a matter of grace and not a matter of right). 
 30. See, e.g., Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service Goes Public: The Litigative Use of the Freedom of Information Act, 14 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 42 (1976); see also Wadhia, supra note 3, at 246–48. 
 31. Lennon v. Richardson, 378 F. Supp. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
 32. Wadhia, supra note 3, at 247–48. 
 33. Id. at 247–48. 
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policy had been in place in the INS, unbeknownst to the public.34 Due 
to the publicity of the case and the novelty of the policy, courts quickly 
split over whether such a policy could fly under the radar or should 
instead be made public through notice-and-comment rulemaking.35 
Courts reviewing immigration decisions often distinguish between 
substantive rights—like the right to enter the country or to receive 
certain benefits that Congress can confer or deny—and procedural 
rights—like the right to due process, which varies less with times, 
conditions, or the will of Congress.36 Notably, several circuit courts 
issued opinions that recognized the substantive nature of the rights 
provided by the INS’s categorization system. The Eighth Circuit in 
David v. INS found that it was appropriate to defer the deportation of 
an alien given the evidence presented, implying that “deferred action” 
had reached the status of a substantive right to which aliens were 
entitled if specific factual circumstances were demonstrated.37 The 
Ninth Circuit followed similar reasoning in Nicholas v. INS to find that 
the INS’s policy for deferred action was clearly a substantive rule 
because it operated for the benefit of aliens contesting deportation 
rather than for the internal benefit of the INS.38 While the Ninth 
Circuit did not evaluate the need to follow the APA procedures, it 
pointed out characteristics of the INS’s Operations Instructions that 
would trigger those procedures in any other administrative setting.39 
In the decade following those cases, increased civil unrest 
throughout the world led to greater numbers of foreigners seeking 
 
 34. Leon Wildes, The Operations Instructions of the Immigration Service: Internal Guides 
or Binding Rules?, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 99, 101 (1979); Wadhia, supra note 3, at 246–48. 
 35. See Wildes, supra note 34, at 106 (“In accordance with a well-established principle 
of administrative law, a written expression of ‘policy’ may be a rule and have the impact of a 
rule, regardless of how the agency attempts to designate or describe it. The Operations 
Instruction thus appears to be a firm rule. As such, it should probably be subject to the notice 
and publication requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.”) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 
553  (1976)). 
 36. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953) (Jackson, 
J., dissenting) (“Procedural due process is more elemental and less flexible than substantive due 
process. It yields less to the times, varies less with conditions, and defers much less to 
legislative judgment.”). 
 37. David v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 548 F.2d 219, 223 (8th Cir. 1977); see 
Wadhia, supra note 3, at 249. 
 38. Nicholas v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 590 F.2d 802, 806–07 (9th 
Cir. 1979). 
 39. Id. 
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admission to the United States.40 As a result, the national interest in 
immigration law was high when the Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in Jean v. Nelson.41 In that case, the Supreme Court evaluated 
a constitutional challenge on behalf of Haitians seeking asylum in the 
United States who claimed that the United States’ immigration 
policies discriminated against Haitians on the basis of race and national 
origin.42 For the first time in many years, the facts in Jean seemed to 
directly require analysis of constitutional issues as they pertained to 
immigration law. For that reason, Jean provided the Court with the 
perfect opportunity to provide clarity in an area of the law confused 
between plenary power, congressional enactments and amendments, 
and administrative flexibility through prosecutorial discretion. 
However, the Supreme Court in Jean focused its analysis almost 
entirely on statutory interpretation, conspicuously omitting the larger 
questions about constitutional protection of noncitizens.43 Justice 
Marshall dissented, however, preferring to base the decision on the 
constitutional grounds suggested by the facts and invalidate the policy 
as discriminatory on the basis of national origin.44 These kinds of 
decisions have been described as the application of “phantom” 
constitutional norms that allow the Court to avoid addressing 
sensitive constitutional issues.45 Courts have used these norms to 
uphold statutory and regulatory requirements that are able to benefit 
individuals subject to deportation proceedings on a case by case basis, 
while gradually inserting constitutional arguments that would have 
been precluded by plenary power.46 As a result, the plenary power 
doctrine has been weakened in practice, even though no explicit 
judicial pronouncements have overturned it. 
D. The 1996 Act 
The most recent chapter in the story of congressional control and 
oversight of immigration was written in 1996 when Congress passed 
 
 40. See Motomura, supra note 6, at 546. 
 41. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). 
 42. Id. at 848. 
 43. See Motomura, supra note 6, at 547–48. 
 44. See Jean, 472 U.S. at 861 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[The regulations] do not, by 
their terms, prohibit the consideration of race or national origin.”). 
 45. See Motomura, supra note 6, at 592–93. 
 46. Id. at 564–65. 
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amendments to the INA, known as the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)47 and the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).48 In essence, AEDPA 
limited the INA’s judicial review provision by barring review of final 
deportation orders against aliens that had been convicted of crimes.49 
Shortly thereafter, IIRIRA was enacted to similarly limit judicial 
review, and to add several protections for immigration officials in 
various discretionary capacities.50 These acts had the cumulative effect 
of increasing the efficiency of immigration officials by making more 
resources available to them and reducing the likelihood of judicial 
review.51 However, the acts were also widely criticized for failing to 
account for the rights of accused criminals and individuals subject to 
“efficient” deportation without a mechanism for review by 
the judiciary.52 
II. APPLYING THE APA TO EXECUTIVE MANDATES 
In the past two decades, the executive branch has issued a number 
of mandates related to immigration.53 In 1987, President Reagan 
announced that residency granted to aliens under the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986 would be extended to the children 
 
 47. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 and 
18 U.S.C.). 
 48. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 49. See Neuman, supra note 25, at 1975–76. 
 50. IIRIRA §§ 309(c)(I), 309 (c)(4), 110 Stat. at 3009-625, 3009-626-27; see Neuman, 
supra note 25, at 1975–76. 
 51. See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the 
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1943 (2000). 
 52. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some 
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1893 (2000) (“If 
criminal aliens are no longer here, and if they are prevented from returning, they are ipso facto 
no longer part of our crime problem . . . [because they become] somebody else’s problem.”); 
Morawetz, supra note 51, at 1943; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Policy and Politics of 
Immigrant Rights, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 387 (2007). 
 53. See Danny Vinik, Reagan and Bush Acted Unilaterally on Immigration, Too—for the 
Same Reason That Obama Will, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 19, 2014), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/120334/obama-immigration-order-legal-bush-and-
reagans-were. 
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of those new residents.54 Later, in 1991, President George H.W. Bush 
further extended residency to spouses of these new residents.55 More 
recently, in 2012, President Obama, through the DHS, announced 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA).56 The initiative was 
met with significant backlash from conservatives in Congress57 and on 
the Supreme Court,58 who claimed that the action was unprecedented 
because, unlike Presidents Reagan and Bush’s actions, it was not based 
on a preceding statutory grant of authority. But most importantly for 
the purposes of this Comment, DACA initiated a renewed debate 
surrounding the legitimacy of unilateral executive action in 
immigration matters and the applicability of the APA in limiting those 
actions.59 In order to fully understand the interaction between 
immigration mandates and the APA, one must be familiar with the 
general background and history of the APA, as well as the specific 
procedures that are required for certain administrative actions. The 
following section first discusses the history and background of the 
APA, then provides greater detail on the procedures required for 
administrative rules, and finally, reviews the arguments for and against 
applying the APA’s procedural requirements to DACA. 
A. History and Background of the APA 
In the midst of the Great Depression, when the United States 
economy was on the brink of collapse and many questioned the 
validity of free market principles, politicians of all political stripes—
both conservative and liberal—dramatically increased the number of 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., Secretary Napolitano Announces Deferred Action Process 
for Young People Who Are Low Enforcement Priorities, (June 15, 2012), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/06/15/secretary-napolitano-announces-deferred-action-
process-young-people-who-are-low. 
 57. See, e.g., Letter from Lamar Smith, Chair, House Judiciary Comm., to John Morton, 
Director, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Immigration and Customs Enforcement (July 3, 2012). 
 58. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2522 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Lauren Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the Absence of Immigration 
Reform, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 255, 260 (2013). 
 59. See Greg Sargent, What the debate over Obama and deportations is really about, WASH. 
POST: THE PLUM LINE (Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-
line/wp/2014/08/13/what-the-debate-over-obama-and-deportations-is-really-about. 
6.MCCARTY.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/18/2017  9:25 AM 
1563 Transparent Review of Agency Immigration Decisions 
 1575 
administrative agencies in Washington.60 With that increase, the need 
for administrative reform became increasingly clear throughout the 
first half of the twentieth century, and various bills were introduced to 
limit administrative power.61 However, most of those bills were 
motivated, in large part, by those seeking to limit the policies of 
whichever party controlled the agencies at that time.62 
Substantial disagreements on a variety of issues in administrative 
law made it necessary to draft the Act’s provisions with enough 
ambiguity to gain acceptance by a majority of the members of 
Congress.63 Thus, when the Act was passed in 1946, it provided little 
guidance for interpreting the APA as it applies to immigration law.64 
Alternatively, an extensive legislative history was created as the 
opposing sides in the administrative law debate issued dueling 
interpretations in hopes of influencing future judicial decisions.65 
Unfortunately, those efforts created legislative records that are as 
conflicted as the statute itself and the case law applying it.66 Thus, a 
considerable amount of ambiguity still exists regarding the application 
of the APA. 
The APA is generally understood to implement a set of procedures 
in four different kinds of administrative actions: informal and formal 
rulemaking, and informal and formal adjudications.67 The lines 
between formal adjudication, informal adjudication, and agency 
discretion are not altogether clear from the text of the APA or 
subsequent case law.68 Generally speaking, formal adjudications can be 
defined as the application of the statute that an agency is charged to 
 
 60. George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges 
from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1561–62 (1996) (noting that in the first 
three decades of the twentieth century, even as “conservatives dominated national politics, 
the number of agencies doubled,” and that the growth “quickened under Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s administration”). 
 61. Id. at 1565–80. 
 62. Id.at 1567. 
 63. Id. at 1662–64. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1663. 
 66. Id. at 1665–66. 
 67. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 305 (7th ed. 2016). 
 68. Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 489 (1986). 
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administer in accordance with agency policy to a specific set of facts.69 
Section 554 of the APA sets forth the requirements for notice that 
must be given to affected parties and procedures that must be 
followed in formal adjudication hearings.70 Informal adjudications, on 
the other hand, include the application and development of agency 
practices, and therefore do not include the same hearing requirements, 
such as the application of law to facts.71 
Perhaps most importantly for this Comment, section 553 outlines 
the procedures for rulemaking.72 It first lists exceptions to the 
procedures for the “military or foreign affairs function of the United 
States,” and for matters “relating to agency management or personnel 
or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.”73 Section 
553 also specifically states that these procedural requirements do not 
apply to “interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of 
agency organization, procedure, or practice.”74 Accordingly, the 
procedures in section 553 apply to informal rulemaking that creates 
generally applicable rules. Informal rulemaking has been broadly 
construed by courts to include even narrow decisions about when to 
grant licenses.75 Formal rulemaking, on the other hand, is subject to 
sections 556 and 557, which set forth the hearing requirements when 
a statute requires the rules to be made “on the record” and “after 
opportunity for an agency hearing.”76 Thus, formal rulemaking 
procedures are rarely reviewed by courts, while cases considering the 
procedures used for more common informal rulemaking abound. 
In terms of judicial review, the APA requires that courts “compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” and set 
 
 69. Shapiro, supra note 68, at 481 (categorizing three types of decisions requiring agency 
judgment: (1) every day decisions made by agencies that consist of “basic fact determinations 
that recur in case after case and infrequently raise questions of policy or law,” (2) formal 
adjudications involving a “mix of particularized considerations of past conduct with 
considerations of agency policy,” and (3) informal adjudications that involve the application and 
development of agency practices). 
 70. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2012). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. § 553. 
 73. Id. § 553(a)(1)–(a)(2). 
 74. Id. § 553(b)(3)(A). 
 75. See, e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 
519, 526–27, 546–48 (1978). 
 76. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 556, 557. 
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aside agency decisions that are “arbitrary [and] capricious.”77 Given 
that this provision was enacted in 1946, the drafters of the APA likely 
did not intend it to refer to the kind of “arbitrary and capricious” 
review that developed along with other judicial innovations in the 
1960s, but it has nevertheless been applied accordingly.78 Some 
commentators discuss evidence that Congress did not intend to create 
the high degree of judicial deference that has been afforded to 
agencies.79 Despite this general trend toward deference, or perhaps in 
part because of it, much of the case law surrounding the APA 
remains ambiguous. 
The APA’s procedural requirements have been used to invalidate 
agency actions that fail to implement proper procedures required by 
the APA in conjunction with the statute that grants power to the 
agency. Initially, courts reviewed administrative action under two 
standards: In cases where the court concluded that Congress intended 
a specific result but simply expressed that result unclearly, the court 
would review the administrative decision de novo.80 However, in cases 
where the statute made it clear that Congress intended for the agencies 
to have discretion in administering the statute, courts gave deference 
to the agency’s interpretation.81 That dual approach changed when the 
Supreme Court handed down its landmark decision in Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, which provided a 
two-step approach to reviewing administrative decisions.82  
First, courts are to evaluate whether Congress spoke directly to 
the question at issue.83 If so, the question should be resolved according 
to Congress’s pronouncement.84 If not, courts move to the second 
step, where they evaluate whether the agency’s construction was 
 
 77. Id. § 706(1)–(2)(A) (1994); see, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 
401 U.S. 402, 403 (1971). 
 78. Peter L. Strauss, Changing Times: The APA at Fifty, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1389, 
1401 (1996). 
 79. Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. 
L. REV. 271, 289–90 (1986). 
 80. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 511, 516 (1989). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 83. Id. at 842; see also Scalia, supra note 80, at 511–12. 
 84. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43; see also Scalia, supra note 80, at 511–12. 
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reasonable and permissible within the limits of the statute.85 The 
Court has held that Chevron applies to decisions made by the Board 
of Immigrations Appeals, although courts continue to recognize 
exceptions due to the political and foreign-relations functions of 
immigration officials.86 In essence, those exceptions represent an 
extension of the plenary power doctrine that allows immigration 
officials in many cases to avoid procedural review under the APA.87 
Justice Scalia criticized the APA’s approach to judicial review in 
general, arguing that under both the pre-Chevron and the post-
Chevron approaches the outcome generally depends on how likely a 
judge is to find ambiguity in a statute or to characterize ambiguity as 
a license to use discretion.88 
However, a few key provisions of the APA have been definitively 
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court so as to provide clear guidance 
in a limited number of circumstances. One provision that has been 
widely and consistently interpreted is the requirement that, in order 
for a rule to be subject to formal rulemaking under sections 556 and 
557, the statutory mandate for the agency action must use the phrase 
“on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.”89 This bright 
line rule has allowed Congress to clearly indicate when it wishes to 
require formal rulemaking procedures. As a result, few statutes require 
formal rulemaking procedures because congressional majorities 
enacting new laws invariably consider them to be urgent solutions 
requiring flexible and efficient application. 
A second relevant point of administrative law that is abundantly 
clear, is that reviewing courts cannot add procedural requirements to 
agency actions beyond those clearly outlined in the APA.90 These two 
 
 85. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see also Scalia, supra note 80, at 511–12. 
 86. See Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 531–32 (2003). 
 87. Id. at 542–43. 
 88. Scalia, supra note 80, at 514–16. 
 89. United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 237–38 (1973) (quoting 5 
U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012)); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative 
Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1785 (2007) (“The Court said that it would not require 
agencies to use formal procedures unless Congress . . . us[ed] in the organic statute the same 
magic words that trigger formal procedures in the APA: ‘[O]n the record after opportunity for 
an agency hearing.’” (second alteration in original)). 
 90. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 
524 (1978). 
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provisions play an important role in defining the administrative nature 
of executive actions and, at the same time, limiting the power of courts 
to impose greater procedural constraints on those actions. 
B. Administrative Rules and Notice-and-Comment Procedures 
The APA requires agencies to follow very specific procedural 
requirements in creating rules that are generally applicable. The 
purpose of these requirements is to improve the quality of rulemaking 
by agencies that are otherwise largely unchecked by and 
unaccountable to members of the voting public or their 
representatives in Congress.91 The APA clearly identifies distinct 
procedural requirements for two categories of rulemaking: formal 
rules requiring the creation of a record in a formal hearing, and 
informal rules that are also generally applicable but can be issued using 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.92 
The most commonly applied test for classifying agency action as a 
rule and determining which APA procedures are required comes from 
the D.C. Circuit, which evaluates (1) “whether the rule is legally 
binding or leaves the agency free to exercise its discretion,” (2) “how 
the Agency has characterized the rule,” (3) “the language used in the 
rule itself,” and (4) “whether the rule has been published in the 
Federal Register or Code of Federal Regulations.”93 In order to 
determine whether new guidance to an agency limits the agency’s 
discretion, courts look at whether the agency frequently exercised 
discretion contrary to the agency guidance provided.94 
Sections 553(b) and (c) outline the procedural requirements for 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.95 First, the agency must provide 
general notice by publishing the proposed rule in the Federal Register, 
including a description of the rule making proceedings, an explanation 
of the statutory basis for the rule, and “the terms or substance of the 
 
 91. See Shepherd, supra note 60, at 1565–80. 
 92. LAWSON, supra note 67, at 309. 
 93. Gilbert, supra note 58, at 290. 
 94. Am. Bus. Ass’n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting 
Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 666–67 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978)) (accepting a so-called policy statement that in purpose or effect “narrowly limits 
administrative discretion . . .  [as] a binding rule of substantive law”). 
 95. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012). 
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proposed rule.”96 Once notice is given, the agency must give 
“interested persons” the opportunity to comment, then consider the 
relevant matter, and finally “incorporate in the rules adopted a concise 
general statement of their basis and purpose.”97 While some have 
criticized these procedures for failing to provide a mechanism for 
meaningful oversight and democratic participation,98 others have 
found the process to be overly onerous given the need for flexibility 
in administrative practice.99 However, because the mandates included 
in DACA and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful 
Permanent Residents (DAPA) are generally applicable, and because 
they do not use the specific language required for formal rulemaking, 
they are subject to challenge on the basis of procedural inadequacy 
because they failed to implement required notice-and-
comment procedures. 
C. DACA and the APA 
When DACA was implemented in 2012, the agencies charged 
with applying it did not follow the notice-and-comment procedures 
outlined in the APA.100 The memorandum directing the DHS to 
implement the deferred action policy was issued by Secretary Janet 
Napolitano on June 15, 2012. It stated that “ICE is directed to begin 
implementing this process within 60 days of the date of this 
memorandum.”101 Exactly sixty days after the memorandum was 
distributed, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), 
which focuses exclusively on the administration of immigration benefit 
 
 96. Id. § 553(b). 
 97. Id. § 553(c). 
 98. Strauss, supra note 78, at 1405 (arguing that these procedures are “little more than a 
consultative process for public presentation of information and views, loosely comparable to 
what might be employed by a congressional committee”). 
 99. Shapiro, supra note 68, at 483 (“A growing consensus now exists that informal 
rulemaking has become too formal and thus too cumbersome and time-consuming . . . .”). 
 100. Gilbert, supra note 58, at 289 (citing Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of 
Homeland Sec., on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came 
to the United States as Children, to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border 
Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., & John Morton, Dir., 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-
children.pdf). 
 101. Gilbert, supra note 58, at 289; Napolitano, supra note 100, at 2. 
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applications, published the only DACA-related rule subject to notice-
and-comment rulemaking in the Federal Register.102 However, rather 
than inviting comments on the new agency policy and criteria for 
handling individual immigration cases, the proposed rule only invited 
comments regarding the wording of the DACA application form.103 
The lack of procedure in implementing immigration law has been 
criticized by practitioners104 and challenged by attorneys and officials 
at ICE.105 The DHS justified the lack of APA procedures as proper 
because the statements promulgating DACA were “general statements 
of policy” rather than binding rules that trigger the APA.106 Leaders 
within the DHS characterized DACA as a thoughtful way to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion more consistently.107 In her directive to the 
DHS, Secretary Napolitano explained that her memorandum 
“confer[red] no substantive right, immigration status or pathway to 
citizenship.”108 Critics, on the other hand, have made the opposite 
claim; an executive mandate that prioritizes immigration enforcement 
actually eliminates prosecutorial discretion by limiting the choices that 
can be made by those actually on the ground prosecuting those that 
violate immigration law.109 While this Comment does not claim to 
resolve the complex debate about whether executive actions provide 
substantive rights, it does assert that a contributing factor to the 
complexity is the inability of courts to analyze the APA alongside 
 
 102. Comment Request, 77 Fed. Reg. 49451 (Aug. 16, 2012), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-08-16/pdf/2012-20247.pdf. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., Questions 
and Answers: USCIS Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n (AILA) Meeting 2–3 (Mar. 19, 2009), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/nativedocuments/aila_aao_qa_19march09.pdf. 
 105. Complaint, Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-CV-03247-O (N.D. Tex. Aug. 
23, 2012). 
 106. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012). In Am. Bus. Ass’n v. United States, 627 F.2d 
525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the D.C. Circuit cites to the Attorney General’s Manual on the 
Administrative Procedure Act (1947), which defines “general statements of policy” under the 
APA as “statements issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in which 
the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power.” Id. 
 107. David A. Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The Legal 
and Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach’s Latest Crusade, 122 YALE L.J.F. 167, 168 (2012) 
(explaining that the DHS “justifies DACA as a systematic and thoughtful way of exercising 
prosecutorial discretion”). 
 108. Napolitano, supra note 100, at 3. 
 109. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, Opinion, The ‘DREAM’ order isn’t legal, N.Y. POST (June 
22, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2012/06/22/the-dream-order-isnt-legal/. 
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constitutional principles while respecting plenary power in the 
political branches. 
III. THE APA AND PLENARY POWER: INSIGHTS FOR DAPA 
There has been considerable debate regarding what, if any, 
administrative procedures should be applied to agency actions related 
to immigration. While the tradition of plenary power plays a 
significant role in muddying the already murky waters of the APA, it 
also explains the uniqueness of APA review in immigration decisions. 
This Part first discusses how the APA would be applied to recent 
executive actions related to immigration if plenary power were not 
involved. It then discusses the impact of plenary power on the APA 
and evaluates how courts have reviewed administrative decisions in 
immigrations cases. Third, it specifically discusses the facts 
surrounding President Obama’s 2014 executive mandate and applies 
the previous discussion to those facts. Finally, it outlines the 
administrative and immigration law issues underlying an important 
ruling by the federal district court, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
and the U.S. Supreme Court in Texas v. United States. 
A. Immigration Actions under the APA 
Every type of immigration action can be categorized as an action 
under the APA. Decisions regarding agency practice or internal 
procedures would likely be categorized as informal adjudication, while 
decisions that set policies for granting or denying petitions based on 
specific facts are likely informal rules. While the labels or titles used by 
agencies in taking certain actions are a factor in determining how the 
agency itself characterized the rule, they are generally insufficient to 
establish the kind of action that has been taken.110 For example, after 
the Ninth Circuit invalidated the INS’s deferral policy in Nicholas, the 
INS sought to avoid meaningful review of internal policies similar to 
the Operations Instructions by clearly stating its intent to establish 
internal guidelines for administrative decision making and not binding 
 
 110. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1153 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(“[T]he substantial impact test is the primary means by which [we] look beyond the label 
‘procedural’ to determine whether a rule is of the type Congress thought appropriate for 
public participation.”). 
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rules with future effect.111 By responding with little more than an 
updated label for its Operations Instructions, the INA did not resolve 
the concerns surrounding the “binding effect” of those instructions 
that made them substantially similar to rules under the APA.112 After 
all, the Supreme Court has held that “[t]he particular label placed 
upon [agency action] by the Commission is not necessarily conclusive, 
for it is the substance of what the Commission has purported to do 
and has done which is decisive.”113 
Far more important than the label given to the action, then, is its 
substance, or the practical outcomes produced by the action. The 
focus on substance is supplemented by a few bright line rules, such as 
the clear pronouncement that an agency action is not a formal rule if 
the statutory basis for the rule is not implemented “on the record and 
after opportunity for an agency hearing.”114 Thus, executive mandates 
that derive their authority from the INA would only be formal rules if 
they met those requirements.115 
Executive mandates also do not appear to be adjudications because 
they do not merely apply a policy or statute to a singular set of facts. 
Instead, executive mandates issue specific, broadly applicable guidance 
to agencies, with which they are expected to conform. There is not yet 
sufficient data to evaluate whether agencies have retained their 
discretion to act contrary to the 2014 executive mandate. Given the 
broad definition of informal rulemaking, courts are likely to find that 
the administrative policies put in place by executive actions require 
notice-and-comment procedures. 
B. The Impact of Plenary Power on APA Review 
Plenary power has served to limit judicial review of immigration 
decisions. The APA, on the other hand, has provided an avenue for 
review of immigration decisions by administrative agencies. In light of 
the provisions of the APA discussed in Part II, the continued 
 
 111. Wadhia, supra note 3, at 282. 
 112. Nicholas v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 590 F.2d 802, 806–07 (9th 
Cir. 1979). 
 113. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 416 (1942). 
 114. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012). 
 115. See id. 
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application of the plenary power doctrine raises interesting questions 
about the doctrine’s purpose, scope, and role in administrative law. 
The purpose of plenary power and the APA in judicial review is to 
allow the executive and legislative branches to take necessary steps to 
ensure the security of the nation and enforcement of immigration 
policies.116 However, given the APA’s purpose to conform 
administrative actions to the underlying congressional mandates, the 
impact of plenary power is to allow greater flexibility for agencies and 
limited oversight by Congress and the President.117 In other words, a 
doctrine that was created expressly to reserve power for the executive 
and legislative branch has legitimized power for what has been called 
the “headless Fourth Branch” of government, while actually limiting 
the political branches’ ability to control the agencies.118 In practice, 
this has served to severely limit judicial protection of noncitizen rights 
where efficiency-driven agencies and a politically-motivated Congress 
continue to enforce a system of “restrictive nationalism.”119 
The APA was designed to resolve a tension between the mandates 
of the legislative branch and the need for flexibility in the 
administrative agencies of the executive branch,120 not to enable 
administrative agencies to act independently, without direction from 
executive guidance or legislative mandates.121 This becomes extremely 
important given that, in practice, much of the work of the executive 
branch is performed by administrative agencies. Unfortunately, the 
practical impact of plenary power is to prevent courts from reviewing 
administrative decisions so that agencies are insulated from both 
executive and legislative oversight. Courts either wholly refuse to 
review actions that fit under the umbrella of plenary power or defer to 
reasonable agency interpretations, requiring Congress to take the 
legislative pains of amending the statute or enacting new laws rather 
than simply enforcing the statutes to override agency practice. 
 
 116. Motomura, supra note 6, at 547. 
 117. Id. Contra Sunstein, supra note 79, at 280. 
 118. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 921 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 119. Schuck, supra note 8, at 3–4; see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976) 
(stating that plenary power can be used to “make[] rules that would be unacceptable if applied 
to citizens”). 
 120. See, e.g., Shepherd, supra note 60, at 1562–63; Sunstein, supra note 79, at 279–80. 
 121. See Shapiro, supra note 68, at 458–59. 
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C. President Obama’s 2014 Executive Mandate and Texas v. 
United States 
President Obama’s recent executive actions raise two questions: 
(1) whether the President’s executive guidance to administrative 
agencies is subject to APA review, and (2) whether the President’s 
plenary power in immigration law prevents those actions from 
invalidation under the APA. 
1. Does the APA apply to an executive mandate? 
Given that recent executive actions have not followed the 
procedures outlined by the APA and were administered by agencies, 
they could be invalidated by a court that finds they are subject to the 
APA. However, APA review may be precluded by the reservation of 
plenary power for the political branches.  
First, then, it is helpful to understand how the APA is generally 
applied to executive actions. Before President Obama issued his first 
immigration mandate for DREAM Act beneficiaries, he received a 
letter from ninety-five law professors stating that the contemplated 
action was a constitutional use of executive power.122 However, that 
letter did not address the question of whether the APA applies to 
executive action.123 The missing analysis that is most interesting on 
that point is whether an executive mandate, issued by a popularly 
elected President, obviates the necessity for administrative procedures 
in issuing a mandate.  
The APA does not contemplate any specific exception for 
executive mandates. However, the historical purpose of the APA to 
provide oversight to those charged with administering congressional 
enactments is insightful. Where the President issues a mandate because 
of Congress’s failure to act, as was the case in 2014,124 it would not be 
surprising to find that portions of that mandate run contrary to the 
intent of Congress. Interestingly, President Obama and members of 
his cabinet expressed their public support for the DREAM Act along 
 
 122. See Letter from Immigration Law Professors to President Obama (May 28, 2012), 
https://www.law.uh.edu/ihelg/documents/ExecutiveAuthorityForDREAMRelief28May201
2withSignatures.pdf. 
 123. See id. 
 124. Gilbert, supra note 58, at 264–65. 
6.MCCARTY.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/18/2017  9:25 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
1586 
with an assertion that it was up to Congress to pass a law.125 DHS 
Secretary Janet Napolitano even responded to a letter urging executive 
action to “insist that as sympathetic as they were, no category of 
Prosecutorial Discretion . . . would be employed for groups 
of individuals.”126  
Even though a popularly elected President has clear democratic 
legitimacy, executive action must still fit within the dictates of the 
statutes that the President is required to execute. When the executive 
mandate is specifically issued to administrative agencies with the 
charge to apply it consistently, the APA is implicated because the 
substance of such a mandate is the same as an administrative rule. As 
important and valid as the motives for such an action may be, the APA 
should not be used when convenient to invalidate actions of the 
opposing side. Rather, the APA should be applied in a way that reflects 
one of the key purposes for its enactment—to protect the separate 
functions of the three branches of government. 
Analysis of whether and in what way the APA should be applied 
must begin with an understanding of the background and application 
of President Obama’s widely publicized executive mandate, 
announced on November 20, 2014.127 Immediately after the 
announcement, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson issued a number of 
memoranda to various departments requiring compliance with the 
newly announced measures.128 Secretary Johnson’s memorandum to 
both León Rodríguez, Director of the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS), and Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting 
Director of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), required modernization of the employment-based visa system, 
reformed training for foreign graduate students, and increased 
promotion of research and development by foreigners in the United 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Michael A. Olivas, Dreams Deferred: Deferred Action, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the 
Vexing Case(s) of DREAM Act Students, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 463, 473 (2012); see also 
Gilbert, supra note 58, at 265 n.44. 
 127. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to 
León Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., and Thomas S. Winkowski, 
Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_business_actions.pdf 
[hereinafter First Johnson Memorandum]; DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., supra note 56.  
 128. See First Johnson Memorandum, supra note 127. 
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States.129 Secretary Johnson sent a second memorandum to each of 
those agencies, this time including R. Gil Kerlikowske, Commissioner 
of the United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”).130 That 
memorandum “[r]emov[ed] the age cap” from DACA, extended 
“renewal[s] and work authorization to three years,” “[a]djust[ed] the 
date-of-entry requirements,” and expanded deferred action overall.131 
In a third memorandum sent to the USCIS, ICE, the CBP, and Alan 
D. Bersin, Acting Assistant Secretary for Policy, Secretary Johnson 
issued “new policies for the apprehension, detention, and removal of 
aliens in this country” by focusing first on “threats to national security, 
border security, and public safety,” second on “misdemeanants and 
new immigration violators,” and third on “other immigration 
violations.”132 Interestingly, that memorandum leaves significant 
discretion in the hands of DHS personnel even for Priority 1 
individuals by stating that they 
must be prioritized for removal unless they qualify for asylum or 
other form of relief under our laws, or unless, in the judgment of an 
ICE Field Office Director, CBP Sector Chief, or CBP Director of 
Field Operations, there are compelling and exceptional factors that 
clearly indicate the alien is not a threat to national security, border 
security, or public safety and should not therefore be an enforcement 
priority.133 
These memoranda will likely be subject to the same criticisms as 
DACA given the expanded reach of their policies. Before discussing 
what these actions imply about judicial review of immigration 
decisions, a review of the current litigation in which various states are 
seeking to invalidate DAPA is in order.  
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to 
León Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting 
Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, and R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs and 
Border Prot. 3–4 (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf [hereinafter Second Johnson Memorandum]. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to 
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, et. al. 1, 3–4 (Nov. 20, 
2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_
discretion.pdf [hereinafter Third Johnson Memorandum].  
 133. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
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In February of 2015, a Federal District Judge in Texas ruled that 
President Obama’s executive action violated the APA by failing to use 
notice-and-comment procedures.134 Judge Andrew S. Hanen, an 
appointee of President George W. Bush, in an eighty-seven page 
opinion held that the executive mandate was unlawful because it 
violated the APA.135 The DHS memoranda discussed in this Section 
created a new program that deferred the deportation proceedings of 
“four to five million individuals residing illegally in the United 
States.”136 In response, the state of Texas and twenty-five other states 
filed this case in an attempt to enjoin the implementation of that 
program.137 Many parties interested in the lawsuit attempted to 
intervene, and many filed amicus curiae briefs, but the judge ruled that 
the parties to the lawsuit adequately represented the interests of the 
parties and that granting any of the motions to intervene would 
unduly delay the progress of the litigation.138 
The opinion considered three issues: “(1) whether the States had 
standing to bring the case, (2) whether the DHS has the discretion to 
implement DAPA, and (3) whether DAPA is constitutional, comports 
with existing laws, and was legally adopted.”139 The second and third 
issues are discussed here as an example of the most recent application 
of the plenary power doctrine to avoid constitutional questions but 
rule on statutory grounds with the same effect. 
2. DHS discretion and the constitutionality of DAPA 
On those issues, the court explained that the role of the judiciary 
is not to second-guess the priorities set by the secretaries of 
administrative agencies.140 Specifically, the court discusses three 
reasons behind the general judicial practice of not overturning 
decisions about non-enforcement: first, because those decisions 
involve considerations that are within the agency’s expertise; second, 
a decision not to act does not bring to bear the “agency’s coercive 
 
 134. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 
(5th Cir.), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
 135. Id. at 677. 
 136. Id. at 607. 
 137. Id. at 604. 
 138. Id. at 608. 
 139. Id. at 607. 
 140. Id. at 644. 
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powers” and therefore does not require protection by the courts; 
third, and finally, a decision not to act by an agency is similar to “a 
prosecutor’s decision to not indict.”141 Thus, the court found that 
Secretary Johnson’s priority-setting decisions were discretionary and 
fit within the executive branch’s purview “to the extent that they d[id] 
not violate any statute or the Constitution.”142 However, the court 
recognized that the executive branch does not have the power to take 
actions that are legislative in nature.143 
Decisions about how to marshal DHS resources are discretionary 
and within the authority of the executive branch insofar as they do not 
violate the Constitution or any statute.144 However, the States argued 
that DAPA did not merely allocate resources, but implemented final 
agency action in the form of a legislative rule.145 According to the 
court’s standing analysis, not only were the plaintiffs adversely affected 
such that they were “injured in fact,”146 but they fit within the zone of 
interests because “DAPA . . . clearly contravenes the express terms of 
the INA.”147  
The court also found that the agency action was within the zone 
of interests even though the agency claimed it was exempt by pointing 
to a statute that prohibited acts that were “committed to agency 
discretion by law.”148 The Supreme Court had interpreted that 
exception narrowly in circumstances where the statute had such broad 
terms that it could not apply to specific cases, and outlined two 
exceptions: (1) where Congress clearly seeks to preclude judicial 
review, and (2) where no meaningful standard is available to perform 
judicial review.149 The court acknowledged that this precedent 
exempted decisions by agencies not to enforce a statute, pointing out 
that there is a rebuttable presumption that non-action is not 
reviewable.150 However, the court cited to Heckler, which held that 
 
 141. Id. at 645. 
 142. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 645–46. 
 144. Id. at 647. 
 146. Id. at 649. 
 146. Id. at 652. 
 147. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012)). 
 148. Id. (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)). 
 149. Id. at 653 (emphasis added) (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831). 
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when the substantive statute “provide[s] guidelines for the agency to 
follow in exercising its enforcement powers,” the presumption against 
judicial review is rebutted.151 Even so, the court found that the facts 
of this case are different than Heckler, because non-enforcement in 
this context granted deferment to an entire class of aliens, making it 
more like an affirmative action than inaction.152 Thus, the Supreme 
Court’s concerns about the lack of a meaningful judicial standard were 
not applicable to DAPA.153 The court explained that DAPA does not 
constitute inaction against an individual, but a widespread program 
that has a history of application as a binding affirmative rule rather 
than a resource-allocation decision, leading to inaction on the part of 
an agency.154 
Thus, the court found that DAPA is much more than non-
enforcement; rather, it is a prohibition on agencies’ ability to comply 
with the law, and a provision of three years’ immunity along with other 
benefits that come with legal presence in the United States.155 Heckler 
was not meant to apply in cases where agencies create new programs 
that provide substantial benefits that would otherwise be 
unobtainable.156 Even if the presumption does apply to DAPA, the 
court found, the presumption is rebutted under the standard set out 
in Heckler because the actions “provide guidelines for the agency to 
follow in exercising its enforcement powers.”157 
The court also found that the INA provides clear guidance that 
actually circumscribes agency discretion in this case.158 The INA 
defines which individuals are subject to a deportation proceeding,159 
and establishes the burden of proof on the alien to demonstrate 
“clearly and beyond doubt” that he or she is entitled to be admitted.160 
Thus, the court held that no statute gives the DHS the power to 
 
 150. Id. at 656 (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832–33). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 655–56 (citing Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 157. Id. at 655–56 (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832). 
 158. Id. at 656–57. 
 159. Id. at 657. 
 160. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A) (2012)). 
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provide additional legal benefits to aliens.161 The INA does provide 
two general grants of discretion: first, an administrative grant allowing 
actions necessary for carrying out the Secretary’s authority, and 
second, a provision listing the Under Secretary’s responsibilities to 
prevent terrorism, secure borders, establish rules governing visas, and 
establish national immigration enforcement policies and priorities.162 
While those provisions grant general authority, the court found that 
they do not include aliens that have already entered the United States 
and are currently here illegally.163 Thus, the court held that while the 
DHS can set priorities and allocate resources, it cannot award legal 
presence to a category that Congress has said can be deported because 
to do so runs directly contrary to the mandate of the statute. 164 
D. Fifth Circuit Court and U.S. Supreme Court Decision 
The United States appealed the preliminary injunction issued by 
Judge Hanen to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit.165 The Fifth Circuit issued its decision on November 9, 2015, 
denying the United States’ motion to stay the preliminary injunction, 
thereby preventing the implementation of DAPA until the appeal 
could be resolved regarding the preliminary injunction.166 
After oral arguments and briefing, two of the three-judge panel 
ruled to affirm the district court’s ruling, and to send the case back to 
the district court to proceed with the trial.167 Judges Elrod and Smith, 
in the Fifth Circuit opinion, addressed three issues,168 which provide 
insight into the relationship between plenary power granting 
executive discretion and oversight of the administrative state. 
First, the Fifth Circuit found that Texas had standing because 
DAPA effectively changed the status of certain categories of 
undocumented aliens by declaring them lawfully present in the United 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 660–61. 
 165. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015), as revised (Nov. 25, 2015), 
aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
 166. Id. at 146. 
 167. Id. at 147–49. 
 168. Id. 
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States.169 Aliens granted “lawful presence,” a status that is revocable at 
any time, are eligible for certain federal and state benefits,170 including 
the issuance of drivers’ licenses to individuals subject to deferred 
action under DAPA.171 The Fifth Circuit held that Texas satisfied the 
requirements for standing because the state suffered an injury that was 
“fairly traceable” to DAPA, which would “enable beneficiaries to 
apply for driver’s licenses,” causing a demonstrable financial harm to 
the state.172 While the federal government argued that such an 
incremental theory of standing is flawed because it has no conceivable 
limits, the majority of the Fifth Circuit explained that the same 
problem existed in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection 
Agency,173 and that courts could find other ways to “cabin policy 
disagreements masquerading as legal claims.”174 Moreover, the Fifth 
Circuit held that Texas had satisfied the APA requirement that its 
asserted interests fit within “the zone of interests to be protected and 
regulated by the statute.”175 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that Texas 
relied on the congressional guarantee that it would not have to spend 
“millions of dollars to subsidize driver’s licenses or chang[e] its 
statutes” without at least having the opportunity to go through 
notice-and-comment procedures.176 While the government argued 
that review of the agency action should not be permitted even if the 
plaintiffs had standing because the statute expressly prohibits review 
of deportation decisions, the Fifth Circuit held that the prohibition in 
the statute did not apply broadly to all deportation claims.177  
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 156–60. 
 173. Id. at 161–62 (citing Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 
518 (2007)). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 162–63 (referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), which states that “no court shall have 
jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or 
action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal 
orders against any alien under this chapter”). 
 176. Id. at 163. 
 177. Id. at 164; see Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 
482 (1999) (rejecting the notion that “the unexamined assumption that § 1252(g) covers the 
universe of deportation claims—that it is a sort of ‘zipper’ clause that says ‘no judicial review in 
deportation cases unless this section provides judicial review’”). 
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Second, Judges Elrod and Smith found that the executive order 
initiating DAPA violated the APA because it did not follow notice-
and-comment rulemaking procedures.178 The Fifth Circuit concluded 
that DAPA did not “genuinely leave the agency and its employees free 
to exercise discretion”179 because the requirements of DAPA were so 
detailed and specific that no evidence was presented of cases that had 
been denied for discretionary reasons.180 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit 
found that DAPA was not a rule “of agency organization, procedure, 
or practice.”181 In summary, the court concluded that there was a 
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the procedural claim 
that notice-and-comment rulemaking should have been used before 
implementing DAPA.182 
Third, the majority found that the INA did not permit deferred 
action in the form of DAPA.183 The court found that “Congress ha[d] 
‘directly addressed the precise question at issue,” because the INA 
prescribes how parents may derive an immigration classification on the 
basis of their child’s status, foreclosing DAPA because Congress had 
clearly codified a specific and careful plan.184 For that reason, the Fifth 
Circuit held that DAPA was properly enjoined because it was 
“manifestly contrary to the statute.”185 
The United States appealed the Fifth Circuit’s ruling to the eight-
member U.S. Supreme Court. The Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision on June 23, 2016, stating only that the “judgment is affirmed 
by an equally divided Court.”186 Notably, the Supreme Court asked 
for briefing on whether the executive branch violated the take care 
clause, which requires the President to “take Care”187 that the laws are 
faithfully executed.188 This was a new constitutional question that was 
 
 178. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d at 171–72. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 176–77. 
 182. Id. at 177. 
 183. Id. at 147–49. 
 184. Id. at 186. 
 185. Id. 
 186. United States v. Texas, 579 U.S. ___ (2016). 
 187. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5. 
 188. Garrett Epps, Will the U.S. Supreme Court Tell Obama to ‘Take Care’?, ATLANTIC 
(Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/supreme-court-
united-states-texas/425031/. 
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not addressed by the Fifth Circuit, demonstrating that at least some 
of the justices on the Supreme Court considered the issue important. 
E. Implications of United States v. Texas 
Given the history and background of immigration and 
administrative law discussed above, this case has the potential to 
significantly impact the manner and method of judicial review of 
immigration decisions. The federal government was found to have 
clearly implemented a substantive rule that was legislative in nature 
without following the procedures required by the APA.189 The 
injunction put a temporary stop to the extension of legal presence to 
four million individuals that would qualify for deferred action under 
DAPA and prevented three amendments to the two-and-a-half-year-
old DACA program.190 Interestingly, Judge Hanen explicitly declined 
to enjoin the implementation of the DACA program itself, which was 
instituted in 2012.191 Moreover, neither the District Court nor the 
Fifth Circuit opinion holds that President Obama’s use of the 
executive mandate was, in and of itself, unlawful, but that the 
application of new rules by the DHS in order to comply with its 
understanding of that mandate was unlawful because it failed to 
comply with APA-required notice-and-comment procedures.192 
Notice-and-comment procedures exist to ensure that the public 
has the opportunity to check administrative agencies in in the 
implementation of their administrative power.193  Some administrators 
have argued that their job is not to be familiar with the law and to 
administer it to the letter, but to understand the underlying purposes 
of the law and to ensure that those purposes are accomplished.194 
However, the APA sought to reduce the extent to which that kind of 
 
 189. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 
134 (5th Cir.), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); Texas v. United States, 
809 F.3d 134, 170–77 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 190. Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 at 677–78; Texas, 809 F.3d 134 at 189–90. 
 191. Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 at 608–10. 
 192. Id. at 653–66; Texas, 809 F.3d 134 at 171–73. 
 193. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 75 (1938). 
 194. Id. (“One of the ablest administrators that it was my good fortune to know, I believe, 
never read, at least more than casually, the statutes that he translated into reality. He assumed 
that they gave him power to deal with the broad problems of an industry and, upon that 
understanding, he sought his own solutions.”). 
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rulemaking and decision making can occur without oversight by the 
citizens and the organizations that are impacted by it.195 Thus, by 
failing to use notice-and-comment procedures, agencies essentially 
reduce their democratic legitimacy. For those reasons, the Texas 
decision touched upon issues that have deep constitutional and 
structural implications for the future of immigration law. 
The assertion by Judge Hanen that DAPA was a rule because it 
applied categorically is interesting given that prosecutorial discretion 
allows for decisions not to prosecute “at both a categorical and an 
individual level.”196  
In the Fifth Circuit opinion, Judges Elrod and Smith identified 
the competing values as well, finding that on balance DAPA failed to 
follow the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures in place to 
preserve those values.197 By completely eliminating the agencies’ 
discretion those agencies were unable to consider facts and 
circumstances that might justify exceptions from the extensive 
guidelines set forth in DAPA.198 Moreover, the very specific 
prescriptions in the statute regarding the process for parents to obtain 
immigration classifications based on their child’s status were superior 
to substantive rules set forth, without following the proper procedure, 
in the DAPA memoranda.199 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion 
highlights not only the importance of following proper APA 
procedure, but of circumscribing any administrative guidelines such 
that they do not run manifestly contrary to the statue that is 
being administered.200 
The flexibility created by discretion in agency action is highly 
valuable when well-meaning administrators seek to prioritize the 
allocation of resources, but can cause problems in cases of agencies are 
“captured” by external interest groups, or when the flexibility is used 
to make categorical prosecution decisions that are discriminatory.201 
 
 195. Shepherd, supra note 60, at 1562–63. 
 196. Wadhia, supra note 3, at 246 n.4 (citing T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 776 (6th ed. 2008)) (arguing that 
“[p]rosecutorial discretion is applied at both a categorical and an individual level”). 
 197. Texas, 809 F.3d 134 at 171–72. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 186. 
 200. Id. 
 201. David Freeman Engstrom, Corralling Capture, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
31 (2013). 
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When APA procedures are not used, courts are unable to obtain the 
kind of administrative record that is necessary to ensure that this kind 
of flexibility is used properly. Thus, the line between prosecutorial 
discretion and failure to “execute” the law is blurred. That lack of 
clarity is exacerbated any time plenary power is narrowly applied to 
one branch of government without a recognition of how it interacts 
with other branches that share that power. 
IV. REDEFINING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF IMMIGRATION LAW 
Many have argued that Judge Hanen and the Fifth Circuit’s 
reasoning was intentionally based on an “obscure and unsettled area 
of administrative law” in order to delay DAPA’s application.202 While 
it is true that the line between administrative rules and discretionary 
resource-allocation is unsettled, much of the controversy over how 
courts should approach judicial review of immigration questions has 
touched upon administrative law since the APA was passed in 1946.203 
However, the facts underlying the case provide interesting insight into 
the benefits of transparency in evaluating constitutional as well as 
statutory challenges to immigration decisions. 
The court’s treatment of DAPA is unique in the history of judicial 
review of immigration decisions. The outcome of the case involves the 
deportation or deferred action of potentially millions of individuals. 
While the vast majority of immigration case law deals with individual 
deportation or other proceedings, the far-reaching nature of DAPA 
highlights concerns about the purpose of the APA, separation of 
powers, and institutional protection for the constitutional rights of 
noncitizens. In a case like the Texas case, transparency on the part of 
the court in its constitutional analysis has the potential to significantly 
impact the approach of immigrations agencies and officials as they 
implement immigration law. For example, agency counsel would be 
able to issue guidance based on court pronouncements recognizing 
due process rights for immigrant criminals, or protection against 
discrimination. As a result, systems and processes could be put in place 
 
 202. David Ingram & Mica Rosenberg, Texas judge’s immigration rebuke may be hard to 
challenge, REUTERS (Feb. 15, 2015, 11:06 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2015/02/18/us-usa-immigration-courts-analysis-idUSKBN0LM02Y20150218. 
 203. See, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49–50 (1950) (holding that a 
deportation hearing was an adjudication “required by statute” so as not to bring the statute into 
“constitutional jeopardy” even though the statute did not expressly require a hearing). 
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that streamline immigration decisions rather than relying on flexible 
and unpredictable discretion in the hands of field officers. By 
eliminating ambiguity on the ground level, such pronouncements 
could also serve to moderate the political battle over what actions are 
appropriate for the executive branch within the mandate of 
immigration statutes and which actions should be left to Congress. 
Additionally, if courts would fully brief and evaluate all issues that are 
raised by administrative action, such as the take care clause analysis 
performed by the Supreme Court, they would be better equipped to 
navigate the complicated and weighty questions that arise in 
immigration matters. 
If an analysis of the history of plenary power and its relationship 
to the APA has revealed anything, it is that these two areas of law are 
sufficiently complex standing alone. When applied together, courts are 
left to pick and choose the components that support desired 
outcomes, or simply use those provisions to disguise constitutional 
decision making. In their simplest form, plenary power and the APA 
represent two competing interests that are in tension in immigration 
law: the APA seeks to reign in agency action, while plenary power 
attempts to provide greater flexibility. For those reasons, this 
Comment recommends the disentaglement of plenary power from 
judicial review of administrative decisions under the APA. 
A. Disentangling Plenary Power from Constitutional Judicial Review 
It would be a simple matter for courts to analyze constitutional 
issues while still granting plenary power. Courts could recognize 
plenary power by granting deference to the political branches while 
providing meaningful review any time plenary power is used to exceed 
the bounds of constitutional law. Thus, Congress and the President 
would have the power to set immigration policy according to their 
preferences and the preferences of their constituents so long as those 
policies did not violate the constitutional rights of others. Providing 
that discretion while preserving basic constitutional rights would 
provide a clear standard for lower courts to follow and disperse much 
of the mystery and complexity surrounding immigration law. 
If the court had been more transparent in Jean, for example, the 
benefits would have been extensive and immediately apparent, and the 
costs minimal. Instead of holding that abuses of the INS’s parole 
discretion would violate the statute as long as the statute was 
interpreted constitutionally, the Court might have addressed the 
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constitutional issue head-on to hold that the Constitution, rather than 
an obscure statute, prevented the Attorney General from considering 
race or national origin in regulating the conduct of aliens.204 Such a 
holding would have avoided a number of confusing questions about 
how narrowly or broadly the scope of the court’s statutory holding 
applied and whether courts would be required to exercise constant 
judicial oversight of the Attorney General, thereby limiting his 
discretion. A constitutional holding, on the other hand, would draw a 
clear line for the Attorney General and for all other immigration 
officials whose roles fit a similar description. In that case, the court 
would be required only to exercise review where the constitutional 
rights outlined were violated. 
For examples of how such decisions have been received and 
followed, one need look no further than a line of cases that validated 
the constitutional rights of aliens. Some have argued that these cases 
do not apply to all aliens, construing them as non-immigration cases, 
or limiting their holding to due process rights.205 However, that 
reasoning is circular because it begins with the assumption that 
plenary power prevents the holding from applying to all immigration 
cases. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court held that aliens of 
Chinese descent could operate laundries in San Francisco because the 
Constitution protected all individuals within the United States from 
discrimination by the state.206 Later, the Court held in Wong Wing v. 
United States that a federal policy that imprisoned any Chinese 
immigrant found illegally in the United States for hard labor was still 
required to observe those individuals’ Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
rights.207 Critics have argued that Yick Wo was not an immigration 
case at all.208 However, the holding in Yick Wo that constitutional 
protections applied to all individuals within the United States would 
naturally extend to all immigration cases if plenary power was not 
able to prevent constitutional review. Similarly, critics seek to limit 
Wong Wing, arguing that it provides only due process rights rather 
than making a general statement about the application of the 
 
 204. Motomura, supra note 6, at 604–05. 
 205. Id. at 554–55. 
 206. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
 207. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896). 
 208. Motomura, supra note 6, at 565–67. 
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Constitution to immigrants. While it is certainly true that subsequent 
cases have so limited Yick Wo and Wong Wing,209 the commonalities 
between the analysis in those cases provides a much more stable 
foundation for judicial review than the widely varied attempts to limit 
immigration law on the basis of statutory technicalities or creative 
interpretations to avoid constitutional review. 
If Jean had followed this line of cases instead of finding statutory 
justification while still respecting immigration officials’ plenary power, 
the executive branch would not have to mete out substantive rights to 
immigrants at its discretion because the judicial pronouncement 
would instead require that basic individual rights be protected. 
Instead, immigration law has been defined by Supreme Court cases 
that grant procedural due process rights only to immigrants subject to 
deportation proceedings.210 
B. Impact on the Power of APA Review 
Discretion in immigration enforcement is more likely to violate 
important human and individual rights when there is no threat of 
judicial review. While deference may increase the efficiency and speed 
of deportation, courts can do for immigration law what they have 
done for every other area of law—preserve human rights by threat of 
judicial review, while only reviewing a comparatively small handful of 
cases. Indeed, if we believe that our judicial system is what we say it is, 
we should have no trouble empowering judges at the expense of 
efficiency. Our entire governmental system is designed to sacrifice 
efficiency interests in favor of more important values like democratic 
legitimacy, the protection of individual rights, and justice.211 
Of course, in some cases, judicial review may literally not be 
feasible. Just as in urgent domestic safety matters such as nationwide 
strikes by safety or security personnel, or imminent national security 
threats like the Cuban missile crisis, executive and administrative 
actors should have the real-time flexibility to act within their expertise 
in order to preserve national security. However, for the great majority 
 
 209. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 210. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
 211. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (quoting Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)) (“The fact that a given law or 
procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing 
alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not 
the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government.”). 
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of cases and administrative decisions, our nation’s safety or security is 
not threatened, and immigration decisions should proceed carefully 
with great respect for the rights of individuals. If attorneys prosecuting 
murderers or guards overseeing Guantanamo prisoners can do it, 
certainly officials asked to evaluate noncitizens’ deportation status can 
show cautious regard for individual rights. 
Recent attempts to focus deportation priorities on convicted 
criminals provides another example. While this practice is generally 
uncontroversial, significant humanitarian concerns can still be raised 
in cases where long-time residents are convicted for minor criminal 
conduct after entering the United States.212 While the practice seeks to 
remedy national security concerns associated with the increase of 
illegal immigration, it incidentally takes a step back from a century of 
progress toward overt recognition of human rights in immigration 
law.213 The convergence of criminal and immigration law, however, has 
the potential to further insulate those that apply immigration law from 
constitutional review and, as a result, delay the extension of basic 
constitutional rights to noncitizens that live in the United States.214 
Such a policy results in an inconsistent approach to discretion for 
immigration officials because it broadens agency discretion whenever 
officials tend to value immigrant rights over enforcement, and reduces 
discretion when officials tend to value enforcement over 
humanitarian concerns. 
Thus, while providing deference to the executive and legislative 
branches may seem like the quickest solution to the obvious human 
rights challenges in immigration law, that deference in fact impedes a 
long-term solution by entrenching traditional abdication of judicial 
responsibility based on plenary power. Moreover, the veiled analysis 
and “phantom constitutional norms” of the current system wreak 
havoc on constitutional separation of powers by each branch to 
participate in its own balancing of human rights and national 
 
 212. Kanstroom, supra note 52, at 1893. 
 213. Wadhia, supra note 52, at 387 (“A number of measures contained in this legislation 
make it more difficult for immigrants to see a judge prior to deportation, impose excessive 
punishment for immigrants who fit under ‘tough-sounding’ labels, increase the number of 
immigrants who can be detained by the government without an opportunity to ask for bond, 
and remove the ability of judges and immigration officers to consider an individual’s equities, 
circumstances, and other factors when determining if he should be deported.”). 
 214. Kanstroom, supra note 52, at 1907–09. 
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security.215 As a result, the system is fraught with numerous and widely 
varied approaches to resolving difficult questions, leading to divergent 
and contradictory outcomes.216 That is how we end up with a 
Democratic President usurping executive authority while a Republican 
Congress digs in its heels to defund essential administrative agencies. 
What is needed is a uniform standard—a pronouncement where the 
line is clearly drawn in order to protect individual rights. In order to 
provide that clarity, courts should move toward greater transparency 
in weighing the interests and rights involved in deportation decisions 
so that immigration officials must orient themselves toward outcomes 
that respect those rights, or answer to a federal court. 
C. Removing Plenary Power from Administrative Agencies 
A few courts have extended the plenary power doctrine explicitly 
to administrative actions.217 However, most courts simply avoid 
constitutional issues in reviewing agency immigration decisions on the 
assumption that plenary power applies. While Chevron deference at 
least requires a finding of ambiguity before deferring to agencies,218 
decisions based on plenary power allow a court to find that the action 
taken by the agency was one that was acceptable to Congress under 
long-standing administrative practice. Therefore, such acts should be 
validated, without further analysis as a manifestation of Congress’s 
plenary power.219 
For these reasons, it is imperative that courts do not impose 
limitations on judicial review that are based on plenary power in 
administrative law. Judicial review of agency action is already 
sufficiently limited by deference intended to provide agencies with 
needed flexibility in administering the law. Specifically, courts 
 
 215. Motomura, supra note 6, at 600–01 (explaining that using constitutional 
norms only as a guide for interpretation rather than explicitly results in overbreadth as 
well as underinclusivity). 
 216. Id. (pointing out that phantom constitutional norms create precedent that is difficult 
to apply predictably); Kanstroom, supra note 52, at 1920–21. 
 217. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 457–58 (1920) (holding that that an 
administrative exclusion was final unless it could be shown to be an abuse of the power given to 
executive officers by the statute). Motomura, supra note 6, at 613. 
 218. Scalia, supra note 80, at 511–12. 
 219. Schuck, supra note 8, at 31–34 (arguing that deference was inappropriate because, 
for some reason, when “sovereignty confronts strangers, the Constitution can be subordinated 
to a congressional statute, indeed, to mere administrative practice”). 
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reviewing agency action should use Chevron deference to prioritize the 
mandates of the legislative branch over agency interpretations, and 
reserve plenary power for analysis of strictly legislative and executive 
action. In today’s complex, bureaucratic, administrative state, analysis 
of executive agency action is complicated enough, and plenary power 
has only served to prevent careful review of immigration agencies’ 
attempts to administer the mandates of the political branches. 
Interestingly, an empirical review of 1,843 cases after Nicholas 
reveals both the substantive nature of rights that are provided and the 
importance of not granting plenary power to agencies.220 The study of 
1,843 deportation cases reveals that many candidates for deportation 
qualified for deferred status because they were deemed mentally 
incompetent or infirm— the very same grounds for which they had 
initially been subjected to deportation.221 The study found that over 
100 of the 1,843 individuals were granted deferred status for 
“humanitarian factors,” despite the fact that they had been convicted 
of criminal drug offenses.222 That study, and the secretive nature of the 
deferred action policy prior to Lennon, demonstrate the importance 
of judicial review of administrative actions that is not limited by 
plenary power. In sum, Lennon and Nicholas brought public and 
political attention to the fact that the use of plenary power in 
reviewing agency action actually counteracts plenary power that 
should be reserved for the executive and legislative branches. To the 
extent that courts fail to review agency action, agencies are free to act 
independently from or contrary to the will of the political branches 
of government. 
CONCLUSION 
While a more comprehensive review of the interaction between 
plenary power and the APA in immigration law is certainly in order, 
this brief analysis reveals at least two important insights. First, plenary 
power can serve a legitimate role in preserving much-needed flexibility 
in the political branches as long as it is coupled with greater 
transparency regarding constitutional protections for noncitizens. 
Second, plenary power has no role in judicial review of agency action 
because those actions are already dangerously independent from 
 
 220. Wildes, supra note 30, at 49.  
 221. Id. at 53–55. 
 222. Id. at 51. 
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oversight by the political branches, and the use of the doctrine to 
further insulate them is directly contrary to the doctrine’s purpose. 
Both of these insights point toward a need to bring individual 
rights for aliens back into the jurisdiction of the judiciary—our 
nation’s watchdog for individual rights. Noncitizens would no longer 
be left to sort out confusing paperwork and agency directives while 
overcrowded immigrations offices leave millions of aliens in limbo.223 
Arnulfo and Pedro, whatever the final outcome of their cases may be, 
will feel confident that they are protected. While these slight 
adjustments to judicial review of immigration decisions will not solve 
all of our nation’s immigration-related problems, they will at least 
focus the debate on the issues that are most important, and protect 







 223. Wadhia, supra note 3, at 298. 
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